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moved by another person? Why do some of our encounters transform
us? The experience of moving one another points to the inter-affective
in intersubjectivity. Inter-affection is hard to account for under a
cognitivist banner, and has not received much attention in embodied
work on intersubjectivity. I propose that understanding inter-affection
needs a combination of insights into self-affection, embodiment, and
interaction processes. I start from Michel Henry’s radically immanent
idea of self-affection, and bring it into a contrastive dialogue with the
enactive concepts of autonomy and (participatory) sense-making. I
suggest that the latter ideas can open up Henry’s idea of self-affection
to inter-affection (something he aimed to do, but did not quite man-
age) and that, in turn, Henry’s work can provide insights into under-
explored elements of intersubjectivity, such as its ineffable and myste-
rious aspects, and erotic encounters.
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Introduction
For the purposes of this paper, I take intersubjectivity to be the mean-
ingful engagement between subjects, or how we make sense of each
other and of the world together. This happens in intricate interactions
that may go well, may be difficult, may be hesitant, enthusiastic,
tense, resistant, flowing, and so on. What many social encounters
have in common is that in them we almost always affect each other.
We are moved in one way or another, or noticeably not (the latter as
such can affect us too). Our encounters often leave us transformed.
This happens most obviously in love relations, where interactions can
have profound effects on our way of experiencing the world, and can
make one more or less curious, aware, averse, critical, sure or unsure,
and so on. This is perhaps one of the experiences that gives rise to the
call for social cognition researchers to pay more attention to embodi-
ment and the dynamics of interacting than to propositions and
representations. Researchers of intersubjectivity have been busy
grounding and constructing the embodied-interactive focus shift, but
while we daily experience the inter-affection that goes on in our social
encounters, this is perhaps the one aspect of intersubjectivity that
most easily slips through the net of current accounts.
Standard cognitivist approaches are not often concerned with affect
and emotion, and when they are it is typically in terms of how affec-
tive states get transmitted from one mind to another, or how they relate
to cognitive states (e.g. Matovic, Koch and Forgas, 2014). And while
one of the main contenders of standard approaches — enaction —
takes embodiment and interaction very seriously, it also has so far
given little due to intersubjective affectivity.1 While enactive accounts
of affect exist (Colombetti, 2013), they in turn can be petitioned for
doing better justice to its intersubjective aspects (Maiese, 2014;
though see also Chapter 7 of Colombetti, 2013, and Colombetti and
Torrance, 2009). When affect is accounted for, it tends still to be done
mainly in individualistic terms.
In order to explore the relation between intersubjectivity and affect,
let us first disentangle the main ingredients of inter-affection: subjects
(individuals, persons), their being affected, and that which enables
their mutual affection. I will argue that inter-affection can be fully
understood only if we bring together insights into self-affection,
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[1] While there are many embodied approaches to intersubjectivity, in this paper I focus on
the enactive account rooted in the autopoietic/autonomy tradition (e.g. Varela, Thompson
and Rosch, 1991; Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2005; Di Paolo, Rohde and De Jaegher,
2009) and first introduced in De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007).
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embodiment, and interaction processes, and enlist elements from phe-
nomenology and enactive cognitive science to do so. In particular, in
this paper I bring together Michel Henry’s work on self-affection and
the a priori community, and the enactive notions of automony and
participatory sense-making. The aim is to provide a contrastive analy-
sis between Henry’s ideas and those of enaction, so as to let them
mutually inform each other.
The journey begins at Michel Henry’s phenomenological criticism
of intellectualist approaches to intersubjectivity, which, he argues,
leave out important elements like those we encounter in love, desire,
resentment, hate, and so on. What Henry complains about is precisely
that inter-affection is missing in explanations of intersubjectivity. His
own proposal, which I discuss below, is based on the ideas of self-
affection and primordial community. The reader may straight away
wonder: why start with Henry’s idea of self-affection, which (as we
will see below) implies a radical and complete immanence of the self
and thus, surely, leads us directly to solipsism? How is any inter-affec-
tion possible here? But Henry’s ideas are of interest to us here pre-
cisely because of how he helps us understand the first two elements of
inter-affection, viz. the individual self and its being affected. But
Henry also provides an account of inter-affection that, I think, can
provide us with some important insights, even if it has some problems
of its own. His view eventually leads him on a pilgrimage that ends in
mystical Christianism — a move that can be criticized in its own right,
but I will not do so here. Instead, I will argue that, with his ideas in
hand, we may also take a more integrative approach to subjectivity
and intersubjectivity — in the style of a natural philosophy approach
that includes phenomenology, science, philosophy, practice, and
application (cf. Thompson, 2001). The idea is that work in all these
fields is needed to form a proper understanding of (inter-) subjectivity.
Henry’s idea of self-affection connects well with the enactive
notion of autonomy or autopoiesis. Autonomy and autopoiesis, how-
ever, are notions that give rise to a similar criticism as that of Henry,
since they are also based on an idea of self-enclosure. How can we
explain being affected by the world, including other people, if the
basis of subjectivity, whether understood in terms of self-affection or
of autonomy, is essentially closed upon itself? I will try to show that
looking at Henry’s concept of self-affection and enaction’s notion of
autonomy together may allow us to move forward in our quest to
understand inter-affectivity. Henry’s insistence upon the radical
immanence of subjectivity and of individual experience may open up
ways of understanding and including affectivity in the enactive theory
114 H. DE JAEGHER
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of intersubjectivity. On the other hand, discussing autopoiesis and
autonomy may help open up Henry’s existential solipsism and provide
possible alternatives to his mysticism.
Towards the final parts of the paper, this discussion will open up the
affective subject to inter-affection, when I bring in notions of embodi-
ment and of autonomous social interaction processes and their experi-
ence, as developed by Merleau-Ponty and enaction.
Self-Affection and Primordial Community
Michel Henry, in a chapter entitled ‘Pathos-With’, criticizes Husserl’s
account of intersubjectivity in the fifth Cartesian Meditation for being
overly intellectualist (Henry, 1990/2008; Husserl, 1931/1960). This
criticism may be limited in the face of Husserl’s overall account of
intersubjectivity,2 but it is of interest to us here as a critique of intellec-
tualism in approaches to intersubjectivity in general. According to
Henry, there is a problem if we only have access to an other from
within and through our own intentionality. As he says, ‘[t]his is not the
other but what is intended as the other; this is not the real other but the
other in thought’ (Henry, 1990/2008, p. 102). In other words, I cannot
apprehend the other solely from within my thought processes, since,
in this way, I overdetermine her. Henry finds this unsatisfying. He
asks, what is the experience of the other? and responds, ‘It is a desire
seeking out some sort of response or nonresponse, an emotion before
the reciprocity of this desire, a feeling of presence or absence, soli-
tude, love, hate, resentment, boredom, forgiveness, exaltation, sor-
row, joy, or wonder’ (ibid., pp. 103–4). Henry deems intellectualism
unable to address this experience.
With regard to standard cognitive science research on social cogni-
tion too, researchers have wondered about the place of emotional and
concernful engagement in it, if the only way we approach others is
from within our own (apparatus for) understanding them, whether by
applying a mindreading, simulation, or other kind of mechanism for
figuring out their intentions (see, for example, Reddy and Morris,
2004). There are other reasons to critize this view as well, as we know
(see, among many others, Gallagher, 2001; 2007; Hutto, 2004;
Ratcliffe, 2007; Stawarska, 2009; Leudar and Costall, 2011). Here, I
want to focus on what Henry has to say, because the alternative he pro-
poses is directly and primarily concerned with subjectivity and
affectivity. He also provides an account of inter-affectivity. This has
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[2] See also, for example, Husserl (1989). Behnke (2008), for instance, gives an interpretation
that differs from Henry’s.
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its own limitations, but at the same time it has something to add that is
otherwise easily overlooked in contemporary scientific approaches to
intersubjectivity. I come back to it below.
Henry’s way out of the problem of intellectualism is to propose that
we form a basic, primordial community with others. For Henry, we
share something rudimentary, namely life, which he characterizes as
self-affection or pathos. Life manifests itself in each living being, and
partaking in life, in self-affection, connects us with others primordi-
ally. If life is self-affection (pathos), and we share life, then affection
and self-affection are basic to intersubjectivity, in the form of being an
a priori community with others, a pathos-with. Let us unpack this.
First of all, Henry characterizes subjectivity at its most basic as
self-affection (Henry, 1963/1973). Subjectivity, for him, is purely
enveloped in itself, purely immanent. Before any intentionality, i.e.
before referring or relating to the world, subjectivity is radically self-
affective. Why is this so? As a phenomenologist, Henry is interested
in understanding the way things appear to consciousness, and in order
to properly ground experience, for Henry, it needs to be understood
first in its pure form, that is, as self-affection. Self-affection is the pure
self-relational feeling and movement of every living being’s own life,
‘a feeling of oneself in the suffering and enjoyment of one’s own life’
(Henry, 1990/2008, p. xii, translator’s preface). Self-affection does
not relate to anything but itself. It is only given to itself, but not in the
way of being an object for itself. It has no object, no intentional given
of experience. This is necessary because if self-affection were to be an
object for itself, if it would have to go outside of itself, to disconnect
from itself in order to access itself, this would already not be pure
self-affection. Only on the basis of self-affection can we build a
notion of experiencing at all, for experience that does not first appre-
hend itself does not apprehend anything (Henry, 1965/1975). Take the
example of vision. A vision that does not first apprehend itself does
not see anything (see also Barbaras, 1998). A robot does not see
things, it only processes images. It is the humans around it that see and
interpret the images and, Henry says, this is because they are self-
affecting beings. As Zahavi puts it, what Henry does with the notion
of self-affection is ‘to insist on the existence of an absolute dimension
of subjectivity, without which no hetero-manifestation3 would be pos-
sible’ (Zahavi, 1999, p. 114). Without first being self-affective, the
116 H. DE JAEGHER
[3] Manifestion of something other than itself, reference to or relation with the ‘world of
objects’.
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‘outside’ world could not manifest itself to us — we could not experi-
ence it.
From self-affection, Henry moves to inter-affection through what
he calls the primordial community with others (Henry, 1990/2008).
What connects us with others is that they also partake in life and in
self-affection. This happens, again, before referring to the ‘outside’
world. If every living being is self-affective, and shares in life, then
the primordial, a priori community with others is nothing more than
this sharing of life. Since Henry describes life as self-affection or
pathos, the community with others is a ‘pathos-with’ (Henry, 1990/
2008). Since life manifests itself in each living being as self-affection,
life is also the essence of community: ‘this single and essential reality
of the community and its members [is] life… every community is a
community of living beings’ (ibid., p. 119). All this takes place at the
level of affect, and Henry explicitly excludes the role of reason in
community, saying that it isolates rather than connects. What has truly
connecting power is affect: ‘suffering, joy, desire or love, even resent-
ment or hate all carry an infinitely greater connecting force than what
is usually attributed to Reason’ (Henry, 2004, p. 159, my translation).
Implied in Henry’s idea of community as an a priori is that we are,
at one level, always connected (Henry, 1990/2008, p. 131). To illus-
trate this, for Henry the primordial community is what makes it possi-
ble for one’s life to be overturned by the writings of an unknown
author who lived centuries ago (Henry, 2003, p. 207). It is because we
share with him the fact of being a living being that we can be so
affected by his words.
But I think the idea can also be conceived as a never-connecting.
We share, we have in common, but we do not — cannot — connect in
the sense of mutually affecting each other’s self-affective structure.
This is because Henry’s conception of self-affection is radically
immanent (Henry, 1965/1975). In a way, as self-affecting living
beings, we always remain within our own sphere (see also Zahavi,
1999). The fact that we all belong to a class of self-affectors does not
yet make us able to connect. Take, as an illustration of this, Henry’s
remarks on erotic encounters:
What, then, really happens in erotic pairing? The caress follows the trail
of the other’s pleasure. It calls upon the other’s pleasure but what it
touches is the other’s body-object. It does not touch the other’s original
body, which is radically subjective and radically immanent; it does not
touch the other’s pleasure in itself, which is outside the world, indeed
outside of every possible world. This is why the moment of intimate
union and amorous fusion is paradoxically the moment in which the
HOW WE AFFECT EACH OTHER 117
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lovers watch out for signs, scrutinize indications, and send signals.
(Henry, 1990/2008, p. 131)
Thus, for Henry, subjectivity is radically outside the world — self-
affection is absolutely immanent, as we have just seen. This seem-
ingly leads to the conclusion that we can never really meet another.
There is only fusion or abyss.
But then Henry distinguishes between the primal experience of
community and meeting in the ‘real’ world, the world of objects. On
the a priori community, he says:
If one must say a word here about the experience of the other, how is
each one of the members of the community related to the others in life,
prior to being related in a world? This primal experience is barely con-
ceivable, because it escapes every thought… The community is a sub-
terranean affective layer. Each one drinks the same water from this
source and this wellspring, which it itself is. But, each one does so with-
out knowledge and without distinguishing between the self, the other,
and the basis. (ibid., p. 133)
To this he contrasts meeting in the world: ‘When, instead… the rela-
tion between the living occurs through the mediation of the world,
when the living look at one another, represent one another, and con-
ceive one another as egos or alter egos, a new dimension of experience
emerges that must be described in its own terms’ (ibid., p. 133). He
illustrates the latter with the example of the regard: ‘The regard, for
example, is an affect, which is what enables it to be a desire. At any
rate, that is why it regards what it does regard, seeking without fail to
see what it wants to see. In seeing, there is always a nonseeing and
thus something unseen that altogether determines it’ (ibid., p. 133).
Thus, for Henry, we share a primal plane (that of self-affection and
community, of sharing in life, which escapes every thought, every
apprehension), and when we meet in the real world (which is a differ-
ent realm from the a priori community), much of what the other is
remains unseen, because she remains determined by us in our regard.
Seeing another (in the world) is always as much determined by, on the
one hand, what we want to see of her and, on the other, by the unseen,
by that of her which we do not have access to. Taking these two ele-
ments of perceiving the other together — the other as determined by
the seer, and the other determined by herself, but which the seer does
not see — it seems that the other cannot but escape us. What I see of
her is determined by me, and anything else of her, I do not see. There-
fore, she is determined by me and really, as she, eludes me.
Henry’s account is based in the self-affection of each subject, which
is shared by all of them. This fact connects them, on his account — it is
118 H. DE JAEGHER
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like an umbilical connection to what he also calls the ‘Absolute Life’
(Henry, 2003; 2004). He himself asks where the meeting in the real,
physical world happens (the world grasped by consciousness, but
which consciousness, on his account, is not itself part of), but does not
provide an answer beyond the a priori community, which, in the end,
leads to a Christian mystical vision, to a sharing in the life and body of
Christ (Henry, 2003; 2004). Maybe the reason why Henry’s descrip-
tion of life, self-affection, and the primordial community is somewhat
obscure and mysterious (for instance, what is the ‘subterranean layer’
that he talks about in the quote given above?) is that he believes that
there is something un-knowable, ineffable, about it.
Whether or not we follow Henry on a mystical path (which is not a
central question for our purposes, and I therefore do not address it fur-
ther here), two questions arise. The first one is whether an opening can
be made where we are able to mutually affect each other in the real
world — where we change through and with others. The possibility
should be explored that the other does not have to escape us. Between
or besides the observer-determined seeing-of-the-other and the
other-determined-by-himself to which the observer is blind, there
may be a third element, which opens up a range of different kinds of
‘meetings’ — meetings that fail, meetings that come halfway, tragic
meetings, happy ones, meetings that increase or diminish the desire to
keep seeing each other, meetings in which you understand or care for
each other to varying degrees, and so on. Perhaps between fusion and
abyss a gradation of encountering exists.
In a way, Henry’s account of intersubjectivity has two elements,
one which is intentional, observational, much like how he character-
izes the intellectualism that he criticizes, and one, the shared primal
community, which is not reflective or observational, but in a pre-
intentional realm. Neither of them are places where we can make a dif-
ference to each other, get properly involved with each other, influence
each other’s self-affection, affect each other. Henry’s subjects remain
self-enclosed — so self-enclosed that they cannot be entered by
another. And when he does discuss worldly inter-affection, he either
leaves the question open, or tells us of his distrust of it, because — as
he seems to see it — this is where the shameful aspects of sociality are
possible; its lies, pretence, indifference, and the social rituals that
mask them (Henry, 2003, p. 206). Henry does not thematize interac-
tions in the real world much and this may be why he misses out on
inter-affection in its most mutual form.
In contrast with this, I propose that we can enter into, prod, and
affect one another’s affect and really, indeed, co-author intentions and
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affects, both in positive and in negative ways, and that to understand
this we need to look at real-world interactions.
What I have done up to now is to introduce Henry’s ideas of self-
affection and a priori community, as well as opened up the question of
whether, besides and perhaps from these, we can envisage true mutu-
ality in inter-affection. The second question that now arises is whether
we can give an encompassing account — that is, an account that does
justice to the experience of such inter-affection as well as of its pro-
cesses, by giving us both scientific and phenomenological handles on
it. Such an account should allow us to investigate the spectrum of
intersubjective affection that we have now reached, ranging from how
we determine one another, to mutually affecting one another, to the
maintenance of a self-determination and alterity. I will suggest that we
can and, moreover, that Henry’s perhaps strange starting points can in
fact be brought into a fruitful dialogue with such an account. But
before introducing this, a few further phenomenological excursions
along the path are imminent.
Stepping Towards Each Other
Intersubjectivity in this more engaged, practical, everyday sense —
those times in our social life when we are transcendent to each other,
but also those when we truly affect one another — for Henry, is grasp-
able ‘[w]hen the human being is no longer enclosed in itself in a
pseudo-interiority as it if were in a box it cannot escape, and when the
human being is understood as a being-in-the-world and thus as being
among things and with others’ (Henry, 1990/2008, p. 124). Doing this
would, in a way, resolve the problem of the other (see also, among oth-
ers, Gallagher, 2001; Gurwitsch, 1979; Merleau-Ponty, 1988/2010)
but, as we have seen, Henry himself remains encapsulated in a certain
abstracted attitude that makes it hard to envisage how we can reach
into one another. Nevertheless, precisely Henry’s affect-layer, the
basic self-affection of every living organism, gets us on the road to
inter-affection. If Henry’s self-affection indeed de-intellectualizes
accounts of intersubjectivity and brings in affect as its basis, this
brings us somewhat closer to accounting for what it means to make a
difference to each other and to move each other. For what Henry
installs with this is how, in the first place, things can make a difference
at all, how they can mean something to us, namely: not unless there is
self-affection and this self-affection is affective (pathic).
Another important step in taking the subject out of his interiority is
to incarnate him, i.e. to take him out of the reflective mode and into the
120 H. DE JAEGHER
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pre-reflective body. This reshapes the problem of other minds, as we
see in the work of Merleau-Ponty. Dillon describes it well when he
discusses Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of intersubjectivity. He says,
‘[t]here is a problem of other minds because others are conceived as
minds; as soon as others are regarded as incarnate in their bodies, the
problem disappears’ (Dillon, 1988, p. 114). Indeed, when subjects
(and thus also ‘others’) are conceived as embodied and unitary (mind
and body at one), what they intend and feel becomes visible. Embodi-
ment, for Merleau-Ponty, is a condition of possibility for intersub-
jectivity. In and through our bodies, we express intentions, and it is
also our bodies that make us able to perceive intentions in others. The
body manifests elements of both ipseity and alterity — it is both famil-
iar and foreign to us at the same time, and thus it carries within it
something of the dually-determined experience of the other we have
seen above. And while we may never fully know ourselves, others
may perceive intentions of ours that we were not aware of.
Merleau-Ponty, like Henry, is critical of overly intellectual
accounts of intersubjectivity. In order to improve the situation,
Merleau-Ponty brings the body into intersubjectivity, finds our feet
and puts them firmly on the ground, so that now we can take a step
closer to each other (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012; 1988/2010).
Interacting
There is still an element missing before we can do full justice to the
inter-affection in our encounters with others. Visibility of intentions,
even of subjects affective to the core, requires no more than two indi-
viduals facing each other: one expressing, the other perceiving the
expressed. For this, a static situation suffices. But such a situation still
does not let us influence each other. If there were only this, inter-affec-
tion is not yet possible, because there is no interaction (De Jaegher,
2009). To properly step into each other’s sphere of affect and signifi-
cation, we cannot remain ‘individuals over against others’ (as in
intellectualist accounts), or individuals in a primordial community (as
for Henry). The inter-affectivity that we have been searching through-
out this piece can only be grasped if we get a clearer understanding of
the role of interaction processes and their experience in it.
Consider, to illustrate the need for grasping interaction as part of
this story, the famous experiment by Murray and Trevarthen (1986),
in which 2-month-old infants and their mothers interact with each
other via a live video link, while each is in a different room. After a
short while of interacting well, the infant gets to see, instead of a live
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image of his mother, a replay of what she did earlier in the interaction.
At this point, the infant gets upset. But in the replay situation, the
infant still sees an expressive mother. So why is he troubled? One
hypothesis is that it is because the infant is now unable to engage in
interaction. There is no more live contingency. It seems that interact-
ing is central to connecting, besides expressing on the one hand, and
the perception of expressive behaviour on the other.
Inter-affection
Now that the elements of inter-affection — subjectivity, affection, and
social interaction — are laid out, are we there? Not quite yet. While
we have indicated its importance, we have not yet said much about
why social interaction is so crucial, about what its precise role is in
inter-affection. In order to get this clear, it will be helpful to — for a
moment — translate the issues we are dealing with into enactive the-
ory, which starts from a similar set of elements as that identified for
inter-affection. This will allow us to make some new theoretical con-
nections to further our insights into inter-affectivity.
By enactive theory, I refer here to the school of thought initiated by
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) and further elaborated by,
among others, Thompson (2007), and Di Paolo (2005; Di Paolo,
Rohde and De Jaegher, 2010). My reference to the work of Merleau-
Ponty and Henry in this paper is not coincidental. The two can each
take a leaf out of the other’s book, and the way in which they comple-
ment each other aligns well with an important pillar of the enactive
approach. While Henry can provide Merleau-Ponty’s notion of
embodiment with animation and self-affection (Sheets-Johnstone,
1999), Merleau-Ponty provides Henry with a real body, a capable,
actually moving, situated body.4 This combination fits well with
enactive principles.
First of all, for enaction, subjects are understood as self-producing
and self-maintaining. They are seen as networks of processes that in
turn generate the very same network, under precarious conditions.
This is characterized as the system’s autonomy (Varela, 1979; 1991;
122 H. DE JAEGHER
[4] Henry indeed provides a Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body (1965/1975, see
also Henry, 1963/1973), but he is so focused on the conditions of experience in self-affec-
tion that he does not reach an account of the living body in the world. See also Zahavi
(1999, p. 115) for a similar criticism of Henry’s phenomenology of the body. This is why
Henry’s work, for my purposes here, benefits from being complemented with
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body — a body that is more transactional, never separate
from the world, always involved in the world (see also Barbaras, 1998, who discusses pre-
cisely this tension and contrast between Henry and Merleau-Ponty’s work).
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1997; Weber and Varela, 2002; Di Paolo, 2005). The clearest example
of this is the biological, living body and its explanation in terms of
autopoiesis, but the same idea also applies to other cases (see Di
Paolo, 2009). This notion is, at first sight at least, closely related to
Henry’s idea of self-affection, i.e. to a subjectivity that in the first
place relates to itself.5 Closure plays an important role both in Henry’s
concept of self-affection and in the enactive notion of autonomy or
autopoiesis. In terms of Henry’s idea of self-affection, the closure
guarantees that the subject can experience anything at all, by ground-
ing it in self-affection, as we have seen above. Similarly, enaction con-
ceives as cognizers or sense-makers those beings whose norms come
from the constraints of self-production and self-maintenance. The clo-
sure in the first case is affective, in the second, it is organizational. In
both accounts, it is a condition for subjectivity.
The second element — subjects’ affection, their being affected — is
most closely related to the enactive notion of sense-making. Sense-
making describes how subjects relate to the world in terms of the
normativity that arises from their precarious self-constituting bodies
(Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007; Thompson and Stapleton, 2009). It
is the relational process of signification between an autonomous,
self-organizing subject and the world, on which she has a certain per-
spective based in her self-organization, which entails certain needs
and concerns. An upshot of this is that what subjects do is always,
whether directly or indirectly, in some way related to their self-main-
tenance (understood, as I have said, not only in a biological sense),
and thus also emotional and affective (Colombetti, 2007; 2010). Simi-
larly, Henry’s subjects are always self-affective. The primordial layer
of self-affection is always there, and forms the condition of possibility
for experience in the real world. Enactive self-organization always
happens in a specific body, making for a specific perspective on the
world, based in what is relevant for the continued self- maintenance.
For beings that self-organize and self-maintain, encounters with the
world are imbued with care and concern — things matter for subjects
because their interactions with the world can mean the difference
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[5] This connection was proposed by Ezequiel Di Paolo, in a presentation given in 2010 enti-
tled ‘The Social Invisible’, at the Embodiment, Intersubjectivity and Psychopathology
International Conference, University of Heidelberg, 30 September–2 October 2010.
Answering the question of precisely how this connection works needs further research,
because for transcendental phenomenologists, including Henry, processes like self-pro-
duction and self-maintenance on the one hand, and subjectivity on the other are situated in
two entirely different realms. It is precisely one of enaction’s contentions, however, that
investigating these different levels will be mutually informative (see, for example,
Thompson and Varela, 2001).
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between life and death. This requires at the same time a physical open-
ness to the world, through which the living being can get what it needs
for itself to keep living. Thus, organizational closure is joined by a
material and energetic openness.
As for the third element of social interactions; from an enactive per-
spective, they are particular processes, which can take on a ‘life of
their own’. Social interactions are conceived as patterns of coordina-
tion that can sustain themselves in an encounter between subjects,
who themselves do not lose their own autonomy while coordinating
with others (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Thus, when two subjects
meet, the meeting itself (i.e. the set of processes of coordinating,
co-regulating, coupling, etc.) can influence the individuals’ inten-
tions, over and above what they can do with and to each other (De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher,
2010). This is the idea of the autonomy of the social interaction pro-
cess. It is only when we understand the process of engaging as having
itself an autonomy (i.e. its course is underdetermined by individual
actions) that we can conceive of a meeting of subjects that goes deeper
than a reciprocal expression and perception of intentions. If sense-
making is embodied through and through, and the interaction process
is considered an effective factor through its self-maintenance as a pro-
cess (i.e. an interaction process can, like the individuals engaged in it,
be organized such that it self-maintains), then individual intentions
can be created and transformed when individuals interact. Another
way to put it is that subjects can participate in each other’s sense-mak-
ing (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). That is, in their encounters with
each other, through the sometimes occurring autonomy of the interac-
tions they engage in, subjects can generate and transform meanings
that they could not have had alone. Social interactions play all kinds of
roles, including enabling and constitutive ones, in the individual pro-
cesses that underlie mutual understanding (De Jaegher and Froese,
2009; De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher, 2010). Interactions are not
simply bits of information to be processed by individual cognizers,
but rather, interaction processes move the participants in their sense-
making activities, and these include affect. These forms of coordina-
tion happen directly in the interaction, not through an informational
screen that needs to be processed by individual cognitive mechanisms
(De Jaegher, Di Paolo and Gallagher, 2010).
There is no barrier to thinking that participatory sense-making can-
not go even deeper than being part of the processes of mutual under-
standing and reach directly into the precarious network of self-
maintaining processes that constitutes a subject’s identity. Thus, our
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encounters with others may not only modulate our very self-mainte-
nance, but to some extent even enable and constrain it. This means
that the constitution of our subjectivity can be strongly dependent on
the history of social encounters. Thus, social interactions not only
modulate us, they partly make us into who we are (see also de Haan,
2010; Kyselo, 2014). Of course, what exactly forms part of the consti-
tution of subjectivity would need to be determined, but we have, for
example, proposed that social interactions can affect how neural
mechanisms are constituted in development (Di Paolo and De
Jaegher, 2012; see also Trevarthen, 1989).
Now, to translate this back into the terms of our previous discus-
sion. Henry missed something by staying away from real-world inter-
actions. He could have found there aspects of how we mutually affect
each other (and not only the negative ones). Merleau-Ponty suggests
that we can mutually affect each other when he says that, for example,
in appreciating a landscape, ‘it suffices that I look at [it], that I speak
of it with someone. Then, through the concordant operation of his
body and my own, what I see passes into him, this individual green of
the meadow under my eyes invades his vision without quitting my
own’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 142). His account is also reminiscent
of Henry’s, however, when he further says that ‘it is not I who sees,
not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us,
a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property of the flesh,
being here and now, of radiating everywhere and forever’ (ibid.).
Enactive theorizing shows that social interaction processes can
reach into the core of our self-constitution. This would mean that in
and through social interaction processes we can truly affect each other
— even affect each other’s self-affection, pace Henry. That this may
indeed be the case is illustrated, for instance, in research showing that
social interactions can influence humour in infants and the develop-
ment of self-conscious emotions (Reddy, 2001; 2003; 2008); that
interactions with close others can modulate pain experience (House,
Landis and Umberson, 1988; Turk, Kerns and Rosenberg, 1992;
Krahé et al., 2013); and that good marital relationships can make a
spouse’s wounds heal faster, while difficult relations can slow down
their healing (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 2005; Gouin et al., 2010).
Thus, worldly inter-affectivity is in embodied, affective subjects’
social interactions and their experience.
Enactive theory establishes that we can literally participate in each
other’s sense-making and, by implication, can affect the ongoing pro-
cesses that give rise to our autonomy. We may be simply affected, we
may become dependent on others, our autonomies may be at risk
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because of others (Kyselo, 2012). If we link the self-enclosure of
enactive self-production to that of Henry’s self-affection, we see that
there is no paradox, because we can also link the openness of sense-
making to the openness to the world of bodily intentionality. Enclo-
sure as a process at the basis of the constitution of subjectivity relies
on, is affected by, and is eventually also constituted by relations with
the world and with others.
Participatory sense-making, then, fundamentally allows us to reach
into each other’s self-affection. It is not only the case that we share
self-affection with others merely by virtue of being living beings. Our
self-constitution and our self-affection open up through our embodied
interactions with others. Thus, self-constitution and self-affection
happen with and through others while — importantly and basically —
at the same time always retaining an aspect of closure. This is proba-
bly why inter-affection does not always happen instantly, but can
sometimes take time, and also why we always remain ‘other’ and dif-
ferent to each other to an extent as well.
In fact, the most transformative changes in social encounters are
probably those that affect one’s self-affection. And here, as I men-
tioned, Henry makes an important point that is worth holding onto.
We can theorize how we can affect each other that deeply, we can sci-
entifically research it, measure its effects, but something remains elu-
sive. Henry reminds us that human encounters are in part mysterious.
Everyone in the throes of inter-affection knows this. The discussion of
embodiment and enaction may thus allow for a new perspective on the
phenomenon where Henry left us in existential solitude. In Henry’s
analysis of love-making in his chapter on pathos-with (Henry, 1990/
2008), there seems to be little place for surrender, giving in, becoming
subject to pleasure, resonating, melting into each other. However,
both surrender and conscious, careful attention for where and whether
pleasure happens can be part of a sexual encounter. Henry seems to
overly focus on the latter, on scrutinizing where pleasure takes place.
He concludes: ‘the stronger and more unifying the associative pairing
is… the more evident will be the alterity growing in it and opening up
the abyss that forever separates the two places, namely, the one where
the pleasure is pleasure and the one where it is presumed to be so. It is
in and through this abyss that the other is the other’ (ibid., p. 132). But
this abyss is one space of the erotic encounter. Henry is right about its
existence, but at the same time, participation can really happen.
Abyss, fusion (as seen above), and participation can all form part of
the sexual encounter. Each can occur sometimes. Of course, some-
times an erotic encounter is not even especially connected or
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disconnected. Or involves all of these. The point I want to make here,
in order to supplement Henry, is that it is possible to partake in the
other’s pleasure — that, besides consciously, expressly, maybe anx-
iously searching for where pleasure is for the other, and besides now
and then encountering the abyss between us, there also really is partic-
ipation, sharing, and joint creating of pleasure, and knowing where it
is without having to searchlight it. We can partake in each other’s
pleasure, and know, together, how it is, because we mutually affect
each other and jointly make love, not just there and then, in the
moment, but also in how this experience inscribes itself in our bodies
and in our developing feelings for each other. This sharing in inter-
affectivity comes through participating in a process that is not simply
the summation of individual activities, but a jointly created and liter-
ally embodied pattern that affects each of our affections.
On the backdrop of this analysis, we also get a new perspective on
lovesickness, a paradoxical feeling familiar to many of us. It seems a
simultaneous enjoyment and suffering of one own’s life, one’s living
self-affection as modulated, transformed, moved, upturned by another
in the ebbs and flows of an intricate and intimate real-life encounter. It
thus hints at the simultaneous existence of solitude and inter-affec-
tion, both equally existential.
In sum, considering — as enaction does — the interaction process
as an effective factor (besides self- and other-determination) and
sense-making as embodied and affective, makes it possible to under-
stand how we move and affect each other. In every interaction, you
push the other, move her, prod her, and she does the same to you.
Because your sense-making exists in moving (in) your world and
being moved by it, when we move each other, we participate in each
other’s sense-making. Thus, real connection, where we affect each
other, is in moving together, literally and metaphorically.
Final Remarks
I aimed to investigate an under-studied aspect of intersubjectivity:
inter-affection. Bringing together work by Henry on self-affection
and primordial community, by Merleau-Ponty on embodiment, and
enactive concepts of subjectivity and participatory sense-making, I
have proposed that the self-affection of embodied subjects is co-con-
stituted in interaction, that subjects and interactions make, constrain,
and enable each other, and that these processes are intrinsic to inter-
subjectivity and to mutually affecting each other.
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In order to do so, I have had to modify Henry’s conception of self-
affection, and to open it up in a way that seems — initially at least —
similar to how an autonomous system’s organizational closure is nec-
essarily also open. I am aware that this may not be in line with all of
Henry scholarship, and may be criticized from that field. Nor have I
addressed all the precise connections, similarities, and differences
between the issues of closure and openness in Henry’s thought on the
one hand and in enactive theory on the other. These remain to be fur-
ther investigated. But my aim here was to investigate inter-affectivity,
and to let Henry and enaction speak to each other in ways that might
move us beyond an under-connected conception of intersubjectivity.
With respect to Henry’s mysticism, I have suggested that another
option is to take an integrative naturalistic approach (in the widest
sense, including materiality, phenomenology, and perhaps even spiri-
tuality) to inter-affection. I have argued that, speaking to Henry’s
argument, enaction may provide a possibly extended explanation of
inter-affectivity, different to a mystic one, but one in which the ineffa-
ble and mysterious aspects of our intersubjectivity may have a place.
In turn, for enactive theorizing, Henry opens up realms that it has so
far not been able to speak about much: that same ineffable mystery in
our encounters with each other. In line with this, recent work by
Koubová (2014) brings to light an element of what she calls ‘invisible
excess of sense’ in social interactions. She argues that the secret, the
unknown, the hidden, the mysterious, and the ineffable have their own
place in intersubjectivity, precisely as silent, invisible elements. The
conclusion of this would be that understanding and affecting each
other happens in figuring each other out, in interacting with each
other, and in leaving each other be.
Henry’s work also prompted a discussion of inter-affectivity in sex-
ual encounters. Theorizing embodied intersubjectivity only skirts
around the deepest aspects of the issue if it does not also address the
theme of encountering another’s body in the most intimate of ways.
This excursion was thus a welcome one for enactive work on inter-
subjectivity, and one that certainly also deserves further research.
Inter-affectivity encompasses a range of ways in which we affect
each other, from determining another in trying to grasp her emotions
or intentions, over maintaining one’s alterity in the face of another, to
the deep mutual affection that can happen in intimate encounters. In
this paper, I have focused on here-and-now, face-to-face meetings.
But given this analysis, we may also start to rethink interactions across
longer times and at greater distances. When, for example, fictional
characters or people who are far away move us, this may be under-
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stood in ways that rely on similar principles as the ones I described as
constitutive of inter-affection in face-to-face encounters. Claiming
that interaction is necessary for inter-affection does not entail that
there has to be face-to-face interaction in each and every instance of
inter-affectivity. Inter-affection is based, in part, on sharing with oth-
ers some basic and primordial conditions of subjectivity, along the
lines of Henry’s self-affection and enaction’s self-production and self-
maintenance. However, what is also needed for this to work across
time and space are the subjects who, as subjects — i.e. as self-organiz-
ing, self-maintaining, and self-affecting sense-makers — are present
in situations of mutual affection, and thus able and likely to be
affected.
These two inextricably intertwined points can also be illustrated
with the example from Murray and Trevarthen’s research discussed
above. Here, a question might be: isn’t what causes the infant to be
upset (to be affected) the absence of interaction? Can we then speak of
inter-affection in this case? I would say yes, since it is only on the
background of interacting that its absence is so painful for the infant.
If mother and infant are not allowed to come to an episode of engaging
(interacting) well before the infant’s monitor is switched to the replay,
the effect disappears (Nadel et al., 1999). The effect only exists within
the context of interactive experience, and I would argue that this is
because of our developmental and existential background of being
thoroughly interactive, affective beings.
What I hope to have shown is that, in the gaps between under- and
overdetermining each other, and between intellectualist accounts and
ones that presuppose connection, it is possible to grasp how we affect
each other. This can be done by giving due to social interaction pro-
cesses, including their experience, between subjects understood as
constitutively embodied, intersubjective, and affective. Only then can
we understand inter-subjectivity.
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